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Corporate limited liability has a long and contentious history, stretching back to the mid-19
th century 
and beyond. Initially being hailed as one of the decisive legal invention of our age, recently scholars 
have highlighted the negative effects of curtailing liability. This in turn has inspired research in the 
historical origins of liability.  While the debate on the adoption of limited liability for joint stock 
companies in Britain and the United States in the 19
th century is comparatively well documented, 
little is known about the contemporary German debate. Thus, this paper aims to shed light on the 
debate  within  the  Prussian  Government  which  surrounded  the  Stock  Corporation  Act  of  1843. 
Drawing on primary sources of the debate within the Prussian administration in the course of the 
legislative process, it tries to examine whether limited liability was indeed seen as a prerequisite for 
the existence of joint-stock companies as its supporters claim. I find that in line with British and 
American  experience  limited  liability  was  not  universally  seen  as  a  necessary  condition  for 
incorporated joint-stock companies. In fact, the course of the debate suggests that limited liability 
was  finally  introduced  because  the  administration  wrongly  assumed  that  joint  stock  companies 
always comprised a large number of shareholders with little equity each, being obviously unaware of 
the  possibility  of  joint  stock  companies  being  dominated  by  large  shareholders  and  institutional 
investors. Moreover, limited liability for shareholders was regarded as being similar to that of passive 
‘sleeping’ partners, a justification that seems problematic in the light of today’s virtually all powerful 
institutional investors.  
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Introduction 
  Many economists have argued that one of the reasons for the current crisis is without doubt 
the massive occurrence of moral hazard on financial markets. In fact, in the last decade there were 
numerous examples for business models that were highly risk prone due to a lack of liability.
2 In the 
absence  of  liability  that  internalises  the  full  costs  of  private  actions  (Carney,  2000,  p.  665), 
institutions and private agent alike became ever more ri sk prone, a dilemma that was brought 
sharply into focus in the current crisis (Blankenburg et al., 2010, pp. 823-824). Especially in Germany 
with its ‘ordoliberal’ tradition which highlights the importance of liability for the functioning of free 
and competitive markets (Eucken, 1990), several economists have pointed to the widespread lack of 
liability as the main design flaw of the current financial architecture (Michler and Thieme, 2009; 
Ilgmann and van Suntum 2008; Sinn, 2009) 
Despite this mounting criticism, limited liability will most likely continue to be an important 
part of the institutional architecture of modern market economies. While there are today numerous 
types of corporate forms that limit owner liability,
3 the most important one is the limited liability of 
shareholders and management of joint-stock companies. According to the standard view, limited 
liability is the condition sine qua non of the corporation, as it serves three economic goals: (1) it 
fosters  economic  growth  as  it  encourag es  investors  to  takes  risks,  (2)  allows  the  efficient 
distributions of risk between investors and creditors, and (3) it avoids the litigations costs associated 
with seeking recovery from a large amount of shareholders (Carney, 2000, pp. 669-670). Another line 
of argument suggests that limited liability reduces the agency costs of  separating ownership from 
control.  For  example  it  decreases  the  need  of  shareholders  to  monitor  managers  and  other 
shareholders (see also Easterbrook and Fischel, 1985, pp. 93 -103).
4 Finally, as mentioned above, 
limited liability is seen as a prerequisite for liquid security markets because there are high transaction 
costs associated with the trading of shares with unlimited liability. Thus limited liability is a necessary 
precondition for liquid and organized securities markets (see for further references Hickson, Turner, 
and McCann, 2005, p. 460), which allow for an efficient allocation of capital. Thus President Butler of 
Columbia  University  famously  argued  that  ‘the  limited  liability  corporation  is  the  greatest  single 
discovery of modern times *…+ even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited 
liability corporation’ (Butler, 1912 p. 82). 
                                                           
2  The  ‘jingle  loans’  where  homeowners  were  only  liable  with  their  homes,  the  ‘originate  and  distribute’ 
business model of mortgage banks, in which banks were no longer liable for the loans granted, and finally the 
massive bail out of distressed credit institutions by governments around the world, which further reduced the 
already limited liability of shareholders and management for their business decision. 
3  Examples  include  the  ‘Gesellschaft  mit  beschränkter  Haftung’  (GmbH)  in  Germany,  Limited  Liability 
Partnership (LLP) and the Limited Liability Company (LLC) in the U.S.A (Carney, 1995). 
4 Note that the existence of  limited liability  economizes  on transaction costs, but does not enhance  firm 
efficiency nor does it reduce the overall costs of capital for the corporation unaltered. 5 
 
This widespread endorsement might distract one’s attention away from the fact that limited 
liability has a rather contentious history and its free availability is a relatively young phenomenon 
(Perrot, 1982, p. 83). In the United States as well as in Great Britain contemporary scholars and public 
sentiment were often set against it because it was widely believed that limited liabilities companies 
would be more prone to risk, default, and fraud
5. In fact, Britain generally allowed limited liability as 
late as 1855 at a time when the country had already industrialized (Forbes, 1986) and in the U.S. the 
adoption  of  limited  liability  by  the  various  states  during  the  19
th  century  was  rather  gradual 
(Chausovsky,  2007,  54-55).  Thus  it  seems  unlikely  that  limited  liability  corporations  were  a 
prerequisite for industrialisation and economic development as its supporters claim. 
 Indeed, beginning in the 1980s, more and more scholars have argued against the widespread 
adoption of limited liability also from a theoretical perspective (Meyer, 2000, p. 2-3), in particular 
against  the  extension  of  the  doctrine  to  parent  corporations  (Ireland,  2010,  p.  838-839).  The 
historical  genesis  of  corporate  limited  liability  was  in  fact  determined  by  specific  historical, 
sociological and political circumstances ‘rather than the outcome of an orderly optimal institutional 
selection’ (Johnson, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, recent scholars of the effects of limited liability have 
found ample evidence in various industries that many of the widely held believes concerning the 
effects of  limited  liability  cannot  be  upheld  without  ado  (see  below).  This  judgements  supports 
Blumberg’s (1986, p. 576) statement that ‘limited liability is a statutory development that represents 
the triumph of the rising political power of business interest’.  
Against this background it seems worthwhile to revisit the historical debate as this might 
improve our understanding on the origins of limited liability,
6 also because it was the 19
th century 
that shaped the key institutions of today’s economy (Johnson, 2020, p. 11). While the debate on the 
adoption of limited liability for joint stock companies in Britain and the United States in the 19
th 
century is comparatively well documented, little is known about the contemporary German debate. 
Thus this paper aims to shed light on the debate within the Prussian Government which surrounded 
the Stock Corporation Act of 1843. Drawing on primary sources of the debate within the Prussian 
administration in the course of the legislative process, it tries to examine whether limited liability 
was indeed seen as a prerequisite for the existence of joint-stock companies. I find that in line with 
British and American experience limited liability was not universally seen as a necessary feature of 
                                                           
5  In  the  1830s  the  joint-stock  limited  liability  company  was  seen  as  ‘legally  suspect  and  morally  dubious’ 
business form (Johnson, 2010, p. 2). See also Carney (2000, pp. 662-664).  
6 A similar point is made by Hillman (1997, p. 627)  with respect to the debate in Great Britain during the first 
half of the 19th century: ‘Specifically, in the 1837 Report in the Law of Partnership, *…+ ,and in the 1851 
prepared Report from the Select Committee on the Law of Partnership, *…+, we can more than a century later 
find  a  level  of  inquiry,  a  quality  of  debate,  and  an  awareness  of  history  that  is  largely  absent  from 
contemporary discussions of limited liability.’ 
 6 
 
incorporation.  Moreover,  the  course  of  the  debate  suggests  that  limited  liability  was  finally 
introduced  because  the  administration  wrongly  assumed  that  joint  stock  companies  always 
comprised a large number of passive shareholders with little equity each, being obviously unaware of 
the  possibility  of  joint  stock  companies  being  dominated  by  large  shareholders  and  institutional 
investors. In fact, free-float of shares and passive shareholders similar to ‘sleeping’ partners were 
seen as the idiosyncratic trait of joint-stock companies and justified the privilege of limited liability 
for the investors.   
Incorporation and limited liability: a historical survey 
Historical origins of the corporation 
For  more  than  100  years,  the  corporation  has  been  without  doubt  the  most  prominent 
business entity of the modern world. Beginning with the high phase of the industrialization, it quickly 
became the dominant organizational corporate form of big business in the United States, Great 
Britain, France and Germany (Horn, 1979, pp. 125-126). However, in its origins it is a very old and 
unique European concept
7, which is already visible in revived Roman and Canon law by the 13
th and 
14
th century. According to Harris’ (2009, p. 613) working definition, a corporation is an association of 
individuals with a distinct legal entity. It may own property, contract with third parties, and has a 
hierarchical  and  centralized  governance  structure.  Corporations  were  initially  used  for  various 
administrative purposes such as church entities, universities, guilds, etc, and thus limited liability was 
of  little  importance  to  its  members  (Harris,  2000, p.  127). Prior  to  the  codifications of  the 19
th 
century, the legal personality of the corporation was a concession of the King to some of his subjects 
and required no other justification (see Harris, 2000. p. 18, for common-law; Cordes and Jahntz, 
2007, pp. 15-17, for continental Europe). Because they were created by a state action, traditionally 
corporations were treated as ‘legal fiction’ or ‘artificial entity’ by French, English, U.S. and German 
legal theory and required regulation due to their privileges and size (Horwitz, 1985, p. 180). 
In Britain in the 1820s and 1830s, both major parties – Wiggs and Tories  – agreed that 
incorporation was a privilege to be given only to those large scale enterprises, which were in the 
public interest (Johnson, 2010, p. 119). Nevertheless, free incorporation outside an Act of parliament 
was introduced in 1844. British firms could incorporate under the Joint Stock Companies Act, but 
without  being  granted  limited  liability.  Carney  (2000,  pp.  662-664)  argues  that  in  Britain  free 
                                                           
7 Concerning the above given definition of corporations, Harris (2009, p. 613) states: ‘As a conception that 
embodies all these features, even those that were present as early as the 14th century, the corporation is a 
unique European conception.’ 7 
 
incorporation was granted to facilitate legal proceedings. However, as Johnsons (2010, pp. 119-120) 
points out, this was not only to the benefit of the newly incorporated firms, but also to the public. 
Because British law required all partners to be named in a law suit against a partnership, which was 
difficult, if not impossible, in case of large joint-stock companies, creditors of those large firms were 
effectively  denied  justice.  Thus,  incoporation  allowed  them  to  sue  the  respective  frim  directly 
without having to find all partners.  
Even without limited liability incorporation became thus possible. Within fourteen month 
some 1,639 joint-stock companies were registered at the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, tripling 
their total number compared to two years earlier (Harris, 2000, pp. 282-282). What had been a 
privilege, had become a status to be achieved by conforming to certain legal requirements (see 
Johnson, 2010, p. 121, for details). While this increase in the number of corporations is usually seen 
as a sign for the need for and acceptance of this new form of business organization, Johnson (2010, 
p.  122)  argues  that  1,149  of  those  were  railway  undertakings,  caused  by  the  on-going  ‘railway 
mania’. Normal businesses retained their there mainly traditional organisational forms. In fact, even 
when limited liability was granted to incorporated companies in 1855/1856, British firms in general 
were slow to adapt limited liability organizational forms, as Forbes (1986) and Nosal and Smart 
(2007)  point  out.  Thus,  the  question  remains  whether  there  is  a  causal  link  between  the  rapid 
economic growth of the 19
th century and the development of the corporation.  
In the literature the implicit assumptions, also visible in President Butler’s comment quoted 
in the beginning, is that the development and use of corporations itself contributed to the rapid 
economic expansion of the 19
th century (Johnson, 2010, p. 108). The conventional wisdom is that 
incorporation allowed companies to raise huge sums of capital, which were needed to finance costly 
investments in infrastructure and machinery and that investors were more likely to offer funds if the 
investment could be recovered via liquid secondary markets. Moreover, it allowed the separation of 
management  and  ownership  and  enabled  such  the  development  of  professional  managers  and 
business  operations,  as  suggested  by  Chandler’s  (1977)  work  on  the  importance  of  professional 
managers in fostering economic growth. 
However,  there  are  two  arguments  against  this  uncritical  endorsement.  First,  free 
incorporation become only available at a time when Britain as the world’s foremost economic power 
had already industrialized. Thus, the corporation might not be the prerequisite for industrialisation as 
its advocates claim. There is little reliable empirical evidence of the corporation driving role regarding 
economic growth in the 19
th century, although this is not to say that it played no role at all. While 
most scholars have taken the fact that corporations became the dominant organisational form of big 
business as self-evident proof for its causal role in economic development, there might be other 8 
 
reasons for that dominance, e. g. the use of joint-stock corporation for external growth and the 
restriction of competition (Horn, 1979, p. 166). Moreover, for 19
th century Britain, the need to raise 
huge  sums  of  capital  alone  does  not  justify  the  spread  of  incorporated  firms.  Most  joint-stock 
companies raised only small sums of capital and/or forbade public trading of their share by statue 
(Johnson, 2010, pp. 123-127). Consequently, Johnson (2010, pp. 135-136) argued that incorporation 
was thought after because owners were thus able to ‘hide behind the veil of corporate personality’, 
distancing themselves from the legal obligations of other form of business. It is in this context that 
shareholders of incorporated joint-stock companies sought to add limited liability to their privileges, 
a concept by far older than the corporation itself.  
Limited liability in 19th century Britain  
Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom that regards limited liability as an  idiosyncratic 
feature of  corporations,  the  existing  literature  leaves  little  doubt  that  incorporation  and  limited 
liability are two distinct legal principles that were sometimes combined during the early modern 
period (Diamond, 1982, p. 34; Johnson, 2010, p. 108), in particular in the case of the early colonial 
companies. In fact, the desire for limited liability is probably as ancient as trade and commerce itself 
(Hillman, 1997, p. 615) and different forms of limited liability are known in Indian, Islamic, and 
Chinese law. The roots of limited liability in contracts can at least be traced back to the Commenda 
(Hilman, 1997, pp. 621-622), which can be found on the Arab Peninsula as early as the late 9
th 
century BC and consequently migrated to Northwestern Europe and to the Far East (Harris, 2009, pp. 
611-612). Lately, Malmendier (2009) has argued that even the Roman Republic had an early form of 
an shareholder company, the societas publicanorum, which offered its shareholders limited liability. 
If granted, limited liability was meant to subsidies risky, but politically desirable undertakings 
(Deutsch, 2007, p. 63; Santini, 1982, p. 74; Grossfeld, 1968, pp. 108-110). This is due to the fact that 
the  first  joint-stock  companies  of  the  earlier  modern  era  also  had  considerable  fiscal  and 
administrative functions, especially concerning long distance maritime trade and the rule of colonies 
(Cordes and Jahntz, 2008, p. 22). While French and British charters often explicitly included limited 
liability, German and Dutch charters did not contain such clauses. Nevertheless, their shares had de 
facto limited liability because contemporary 18
th century German legal scholars argued that stock 
was rather a debenture than a share in the company (Cordes and Jahntz, 2008, p. 20), this most likely 
being due to the fact that the Dutch joint-stock companies did not know shareholder participation in 
the affairs of the company. Thus, limited liability in itself is not a new concept. Its combination with 
corporate rights in the joint-stock company and their free availability for private economic activity 
however is a recent and uniquely western concept, which can be explained mainly on historical 
grounds (Santini, 1982, p. 73), not by overruling economic necessities. 9 
 
By the second half of 16
th century, maritime long-distance trade was increasingly organized in 
corporations, regulated and joint-stock (see, Harris, 2000, pp. 40-46). Early trade corporations were 
created by state privilege and raised capital by issuing shares. The financial innovation of transferable 
joint-stock and liquid secondary markets allowed entry and exists mainly by purchase or sale and 
thus widespread public participation in these endeavours. In this context limited liability was the last 
common feature of joint-stock companies to develop during the 18
th century and it was definitely not 
the driving force behind their creation (Grossfeld, 1968, pp. 102-104). Indeed, until the mid-19
th 
century, limited liability was not seen as being an integral part of incorporated joint-stock companies, 
but rather the result of contemporary positive law making (Grossfeld, 1968, p. 105). It was generally 
seen as a special privilege which was justified if the public interest was involved, which was the case 
mainly in banking, insurance companies, transport companies, and colonial companies (Minchinton, 
1982, pp.  146-153) or in cases where huge sums of capital had to be raised from the public (Johnson, 
2010, p. 139).  
Once free incorporation was granted in 1844, the economic policy debate in mid-19
th century 
Britain focused on the question whether the privilege of limited liability was to be granted to all 
corporations (Johnsons, 2010, p139).
8 Opponents of limited liability argued that it create excessive 
speculation, create difficulties in securing credit, and encourage fraud (Carney, 2000, p. 663), while 
the contemporary pressure for limited liability came from different angles. For example, Harris (2000, 
pp. 131-132) argued that the ‘cruel contemporary laws of debt and bankruptcy’, which involved 
personal imprisonment, made the concept attractive. As longs as bankruptcy laws favoured creditors 
over debtors, the latter would seek limited liability in order to avoid harsh personal sanctions. This 
line  of  argument  is  very  similar  to  Johnson’s  (2010)  hypothesis  about  the  legal  reasons  for 
incorporation. According to Blumberg (1986, p. 577) limited liability became undisputed in the wake 
of the acceptance of entity theory that assume that corporations had the same rights and qualities as 
natural persons.
9 However, Horwitz (1985) argues that entity theory asserted itself amongst other 
reasons because it was capable of justifying limited liability bet ter than partnership theories were, 
hence the privilege created its doctrine to justify its own existence: the chicken and egg principle.  
Then  there  was  the  argument  that without  limited  liability  investors would  be  deterred  from 
                                                           
8 Interestingly, while a major policy debate, company law and limited liability never became a major issue in 
neo- and classical economics (Amsler, 1981, p. 792).  
9 By the end of the 19th century entity theory had asserted itself as prevailing doctrine: the idea that a 
corporation is a separate legal person with its own rights and obligations, distinct from its shareholders and 
limited liability. If a corporation was to be treated like a person in front of the law, claims against it would 
consequently be limited to the company’s assets. Thus, limited liability was justified by turning corporations 
from partnerships of individuals to an entity itself (Blumberg, 1986, p. 577). Hovenkamp (1991, p. 42) argues 
that it addressed two related problems: how to protect the property of shareholders and how to assign the 
power to asserts constitutional rights in corporately owned assets. 10 
 
investing if such an investment could mean personal bankruptcy (Diamond, 1982). Recent research 
has refuted that argument. Hickson, Turner, and McCann (2005) and Acheson and Turner (2008b) 
find  evidence  that  British  bank  shares  with  unlimited  liability  were  frequently  traded  and  the 
introduction of limited liability neither increased trading nor liquidity.
10  
Finally, the main line of argument of contemporary advocates of limited liability was that full 
liability would attract investors of little wealth, which would make litigation i mpossible and liability 
de facto limited. The later argument has become known as the Bagehot Hypothesis (see Hickson and 
Turner, 2003, p. 933-935, for details). Turner (2009b) argues in his article on the contemporary 
debate in Britain that Bagehot Hypothe sis was main argument for limited liability, at least in the 
banking sector.
11 However, recent research into 19
th century British banking has so far found little 
evidence for this argument (Hickson and Turner, 2003; Acheson and Turner, 2006, 2008a; Turner, 
2009a). A prime example is this respect is the British banking sector. Banks were free to incorporate 
under the Banking Copartnership Act of 1826, but were not granted limited liability. By 1836 there 
were 118 joint-stock banks in England (Turner, 2009a, pp. 169-170). These unlimited liability banks 
continued to dominate English banking least until the City of Glasgow failure in 1878, even after 
consecutive legislation in 1857, 1858, and 1862 had allowed for the incorporation of limited liability 
banks at (Acheson and Turner, 2008a, p. 237).  
In  sum,  it  turns  out  that  many  of  the  arguments  in  favour  of  limited  liability  –  be  it 
contemporary or modern – do not hold in face of the historical evidence. Limited liability never had 
been a prerequisite for either incorporation or liquid security markets. Even more, it was never seen 
as such by contemporaries. Rather it was recognized as a special privilege – or subsidy – to advance 
undertakings that were in the public interest. Nevertheless, in the course of the 19
th century, for a 
variety of reasons, somehow the two privileges of incorporation and limited liability became freely 
available for private business. Thus, ‘the control of the grantor, the state, or the judge or registrar on 
its  behalf,  over  the  body  which  seeks  incorporation  and  limited  liability  is  reduced  to  a  mere 
formality: what was, historically, an exception is now a rule’ (Santini, 1982, p. 74).    
                                                           
10 The development in the United States was similar and limited liability was only adopted gradually state by 
state in the course of the nineteenth century (Chauaovsky, 2007, pp. 54-56). Indeed, California only abandoned 
pro-rate  liability  of  shareholders  in  1931  without  any  notable  effects  on  share  prices  (Weinstein,  2003). 
American Express Company in fact had unlimited shareholder liability until 1965, although its shares were 
publicly traded with little notable effects on either price or trade volume (Weinstein, 2008; see also Grossman, 
1995). Carney (2000, p. 664) suggests that it was the threat of catastrophic tort and regulatory liability rather 
than contractual liability which led to the adoption of limited liability in the United States. 
11 The other important argument was how the depositors could be assured of bank safety in the absence of 
liability. 11 
 
The historical background  
Previous research on the Act of 1843 
The British and U.S. debate on the introduction of limited liability is well documented and 
some  its  implications  have  been  empirically  tested  with  surprising  results.  However,  the 
contemporary German debate surrounding the adoption of limited liability by the Prussian Stock 
Corporation Act of 1843 is largely neglected by the literature. Indeed, until recently researchers have 
treated the Act with benign neglect and even contemporary scholars of the German Empire seldom 
mentioned it (Martin, 1969, p. 513). This rather inglorious treatment by the academic community is 
rather astonishing, given that the Act introduced limited liability as a general norm into Prussian. In 
addition, the law of 1843 was the first German general stock act and had considerable  influence on 
the first general commercial code in Germany (‘Allgemeines Handelsgesetzbuch’), which was passed 
in 1861 (Kießling, 2007a, p. 194). Indeed, if one leaves aside 19
th century literature,
12 there remains a 
comparatively small list of exclusively German studies on the Prussian Stock Act.  
For the interwar period, there are the works of Schumacher (1937) and Bösselmann (1939), 
both of which delineate the legal history of the joint -stock company in the 19
th century. In the 
postwar period, Blumberg (1960) elaborated on the importance of stock issue for financing firms in 
the 1850s and Thieme (1960) compiled data on the concession of joint stock companies. Martin 
(1969) worked on the genesis of the Act, especially the economic necessities that led to its passing. 
Baums (1981) edited the primary sources on the legislative procedure, including a short introduction 
into its development and nature. Moreover, the Act is referred to in the works of Reich (1969), Hopt 
(1980),  and  Grossfeld  (1968;  1979).  In  all  cases  the  Act  is  mentioned  in  the  wider  context  of 
economic and legal developments.  
However, since the turn of the century, interest in the matter seems to have increased 
considerably. Söhnchen (2005) treated the Stock Act in his work on the history of the prerequisites 
required by law for the formation of joint stock companies and Meyer (2000) referred to the Act 
extensively in his overview over the historic origin of limited liability in the commercial code in 
Germany. Moreover, Hadding and Kießling (2003) and Kießling (2007a) elaborated on the Prussian 
Stock Act of 1843.
13 Especially the recent publications focus on the developments in the history of 
law and on the transition from a system of special privilege (‘Octroi’
14) concerning the foundation of 
                                                           
12 See for review of 19th century literature Reich, 1969, pp. 255-256 
13 To a large extent the work of Kießling (2007a) seems to be a revised version of Hadding and Kießling (2003).  
14 An ‘Oktroi’ is the document that notifies the special privileges of a company, e. g. limited liability, that are 
granted to all participants and their legal successors (Primker, 1881, quoted after Baums, 1981, p. 13). 12 
 
joint-stock companies via the concession system to today’s normative regulations, where corporate 
rights are granted to all entities that fulfil the legal requirements.   
Given that the question whether to grant limited liability to both shareholders and directors 
aroused the most debate during the legislative proceeding (Hading and Kießling, 2003, p. 185), the 
arguments made in favor of limited liability have already been covered by the literature to some 
extent. Hopt (1980, p. 151), by reference to the contemporary works of Pöhls (1842) and the report 
made  by  the  Berlin  mercantile  community,  tries  to  demonstrate  that  limited  liability  is  seen  as 
protection for unskilled investors. Meyer (2000, p. 262) denotes the idea of share ownership as a 
simple  contribution  of  capital  responsible  for  the  introduction  of  limited  liability.  Hadding  and 
Kießling (2003, pp. 185-187) and Kießling (2007a, pp. 223-226) portray the debate about limited 
liability, arguing that ultimate reason for the introduction of limited liability was the possibility of 
wealthy shareholders to sell their share to destitute individuals, thereby avoiding regress to their 
property. According to this argument, which is similar to the Bagehot hypothesis, only raising and 
maintaining the required capital will protect creditors against default and thus the Stock Act of 1843 
is  the  birth  of  the  principles  of  capital  raising  and  maintenance.  The  reason  why  joint-stock 
companies still required state concession was given by Grossfeld (1968, pp. 120-126) who argued 
that one economic policy goal of the concession system was to protect free competition as joint-
stock companies were deemed to be capable to erect de facto monopolies because of their size.   
Summing up the results of the previous research, due to history of law focus of most authors 
their works have mainly highlighted the decisive legal inventions of the Act, because not only does it 
mark  the  transition  from  a  system  of  special  privilege  to  a  system  of  concession,  but  with  the 
Prussian Stock Corporation Act of 1843 for the first time in Germany there exists a legally sanctioned 
corporate structure,  which  is  directed  only  at  the private  interests of  its  owners,  but  limits  the 
liability  of  its  shareholders  to  the  capital  raised  (Kießling,  2007a,  p.  225).  Neither  of  them  has 
attempted  to  provide  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  debate,  especially  with  respect  to  the 
arguments against limited liability.  
Moreover, the recent literature on the subject, with the notable exception of Meyer (2000, p. 
259-260), who included reports made by the former ambassador to Britain, the chief of the statistical 
office of Prussia and the president of the province of Prussia as well as the statement made by 
Savigny, has mainly concentrated on the motives of the royal commission that had been tasked with 
developing a stock corporation act and that handed over the first version of the Act in January 1840. 
Given that legislative process continued to go on for more than three years and that the enacted final 
form varied substantially from the first draft, there is a debate which has so far been hardly covered 
by the existing literature. Consequently, there is still a lack of research concerning the economic 13 
 
policy goals and various motives behind the Act of 1843. This article therefore aims to close this gap 
by not only referring to the motives, but also by extensively covering the later proceedings in order 
to give a full view on the contradicting views within the Prussian administration.  
Joint-Stock Companies and Limited Liability in Prussia before the Stock 
Corporation Act  
Joint-stock companies were well established in Prussia prior to the Act of 1843. In fact, the 
Prussian ’Brandenburgische-Afrikanische Kompagnie’ – founded in 1682 – is believed to be the oldest 
German join-stock company (Grossfeld, 1979, p. 236). Before the enactment of the Stock Corporation 
Act  there  were  numerous  incorporated  companies,  although  there  is  no  comprehensive 
contemporary statistic on Prussian joint-stock companies (see Moll, 1908, pp. 14-50, for detailed 
analysis of contemporary statistics). The first attempt to collect data on the issue is undertaken by 
Engel (1875), who complains about the lack of official data, stating that thus his compilation may not 
cover all existing joint-stock companies (Engels, 1875, pp. 457). Adding up the statistics given by 
Bösselmann (1939), Thieme (1960), and Martin (1960), it results that prior to 1843 there were 90 
joint-stock companies in Prussia, absent road companies (‘Chausseegesellschaften’).  Indeed, in the 
first half of the 19
th century there are two periods of increased founding activities: first the period of 
1821-25 with twelve start-ups and a share capital of 10.6 million Talers and 1836-40 with twenty-five 
start-ups and a share capital of 25.3 million Talers (Martin, 1969, p. 502). The hypothesis that joint-
stock companies become ever more important for financing large scale industries, especially rail 
ways, is supported by the fact that about two-thirds of the total capital invested in shares, about 33 
million Talers, falls in the period 1836-43, a time when the construction of railways took off in 
Germany.  
The possible reasons for this development have been debated extensively in the literature. 
Most scholars agree that it was not a lack of capital that hampered financing in Prussia, an argument 
which is supported by a constantly low interest rate on government bonds. Indeed, most companies 
were able to finance their activities by traditional means, e.g. private credit, self-financing (Wehler, 
1987,  pp.  95-98;  Pierenkemper,  2000,  S.  124),  also  because  the  early  stage  of  industrialization 
required comparatively little amounts of capital.
15 According to the standard view, need for the joint-
stock company’s ability to raise huge amounts of capital was only felt from the 1830s onwards with 
the construction of railways and the subsequent development of large scale coal, iron and steel 
industry (Wehler, 1987, p. 103). In fact, railway companies required private capital on a previously 
unknown scale and thus some scholars even argued that it was their development that is ultimately 
                                                           
15 Borsig for example needed only 65,500 Talers for the creation of his work in Berlin in 1837, of which 10, 500 
came from his own resources (Wehler, 1987, p. 97). 14 
 
responsible for the widespread introduction of joint-stock companies (Pierenkemper, 2000, pp. 93-
96).
16 Moreover, insurance companies were another branch that required huge amounts of capital 
and were therefore often organized as joint-stock companies (Martin, 1969, p. 501).  
A slightly different view is proposed by Martin (1969, p. 515), who concludes that the joint-
stock company is not only necessary for major projects in leading industrial sectors, but also for the 
development of backward regions with under-developed capital markets, where traditional means of 
finance are scarcely available. Only the joint-stock corporations are capable to collect the necessary 
capital for their industrial catch up.  Nevertheless, in both views the joint -stock companies is an 
efficient institution for the collection and administration of large amounts of capital, which helped 
entrepreneurs to effectively tap available capital resources (Wehler, 1987, p. 95).  
Turning to the legal background, due to the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent annexation 
of the Rhine provinces, the laws and provisions concerning Prussian joint-stock companies were not 
uniform. Indeed, the eastern provinces were government by the General state laws for the Prussian 
states  (‘Allgemeines  Landrecht’/ALR)  of  1794,  but  the  newly  acquired  western  provinces  were 
subject to the Napoleonic Code de Commerce, which had become law in 1807, and remained in 
power even after the French defeat (Baums, 1981, p. 26). Given that the contemporary legislation 
had evidently a huge impact on the legal proceedings, the Code de Commerce is presented and 
contrasted against the General state laws for the Prussian states in the following. 
Concerning the establishment of joint stock companies, the French law had already made the 
step from a system of special privileges to the concession system (Hopt, 1980, p. 135). Under the 
later, the rights and the laws governing a joint-stock company were no longer subject to special 
privileges, but were given by a general, abstract norm. A granting of special rights by indivudal 
‘Octroi’ was no longer foreseen, although companies still had to apply for state permission in order 
to be granted corporation rights.  According to the Code de Commerce, the local authorities had to 
establish whether at least two thirds of the initial capital had been paid in, whether the shareholders 
would be able to pay the rest of the capital, and whether the firm’s business activities were sound. In 
addition,  the  local  authorities  had  to  submit  a  report  to  the  responsible  minister  that  made  a 
statement on the benefits and the perceived possibility of success of a particular business (Baums, 
1981, p. 24).  
                                                           
16 Up until 1850, 28 railway companies are set up with a share capital of 103 million Talers (Hopt, 1980, S. 137) 
and although railway companies constitute one third of all public companies by 1850, they were responsible for 
almost 80% of raised capital (Kießling, 2007b, pp. 124-125). Moreover, railway stock were normally issued as 
transferable shares  while most other  stock  were registered securities and their possessions  was linked to 
further contractual obligations (Bösselmann, 1939, pp. 46-49). 15 
 
By contrast, the ALR treats private firms as partnerships (‘Societäten’) and public institutions 
as corporations (’Corporationen und Gemeine’), a distinction that can be traced back in its origin to 
Roman law (Hadding and Kießling, 2003, p. 160). While the later are eligible for both limited liability 
and corporate body, the non-privileged companies lack both qualities. Thus such a company can 
neither make business transaction in its own name (Blum, 1981, p. 22), nor is the liability of its 
shareholders limited. Indeed, these companies have joint and several liability and claims against the 
company are executed against the private property of the owners (Hadding und Kießling, 2003, p. 
162).  Under  the  ‘Octroi’-system  corporation  rights  are  only  granted  by  special  privilege,  and 
sometimes these rights are only partially granted (Baums, 1981, p. 22). From legal theory, the Octroi 
excepts the privileged company from the application of the ALR. Consequently non privileged joint-
stock companies are therefore treated as private partnerships, in which personal liability is both the 
necessary condition for credit as well as sound business conduct (Hadding und Kießling, 2003, p. 
163). That such an arrangement is rather time consuming and costly for a large group of partners is 
obvious because without prior consent of all shareholders, such a company could not make any 
contractual arrangements.
 That this posed a real problem to contemporary stock companies is well 
documented in the literature.
17 As will be shown below, this was also seen by the authorities, and 
consequently the regarded corporation rights as a considerable competitive advantage over non 
privileged companies.    
 Thus, according to the ALR the grant of privileges depends on the companies benefit to the 
public
18.  Besides  a  short  liberal  intermezzo  after  Prussian  reform s  in  the  wake  of  defeat  at 
Napoleon’s  hands,  the  public  authorities  assumed  that  profit  seeking  private  companies  do  not 
automatically fall into this category and expected stock companies who seek privileges to prove their 
benefits to the public. Moreover, already established privileged joint-stock companies are now ex-
post legitimized by their presumed public benefits. Hence, the need for joint-stock companies to 
prove their public benefits leads to an ongoing bureaucratic feud between the applicants and the 
authorities. Indeed, it is this petty paper war in combination with an increasing number of petitions 
and newly founded stock companies, but also experience with the developing railway sector with its 
previously unseen need for capital (see Kießling, 2007a, pp. 194-202), that drove the authorities 
towards a general solution (Martin, 1969, pp. 528-537).  
                                                           
17  See Hadding and Kießling (2003,  p. 162); Hopt (1979, p. 138); Baums (1981, p. 34). However, in the first half 
of the 19th Century companies without or with limited privileges are repeatedly founded, in order to avoid the 
strict state control associated with Octroi. See Kießling (2007a, pp. 194 -195.) 
18 ‚Die Rechte der Coporationen und Gemeinen kommen nur solchen vom Staate genehmigten Gesellschaften 
zu, die sich zu einem fortdauernden gemeinnützigen Zweck verbunden haben‘ (II 6 § 25 ALR quoted after 
Baums, 1981, p. 27). 16 
 
Summing up the afore said, until the advent of the Joint-Stock Act in 1843, there were two 
distinct legal systems governing the rights of joint-stock companies: the system of individual special 
privileges granted by the state as well as a concession system. In reality, this distinction had a rather 
limited impact (Hopt, 1980, p. 135), given that in both systems the establishment of a joint-stock 
company  depended  on  a  positive  reaction  by  the  authorities.  However,  contrary  to  the  Octroi 
system,  in  the  concession  system  joint-stock  companies  may  be  initiated  by  private  initiative 
(Söhnchen, 2005, p. 217), although in reality the continued petitions by companies seeking such 
privileges had a very similar effect. Nevertheless, the Prussian Joint-Stock Act of 1843 does not only 
mark the transition from a system of special  privilege to a system of abstract norm, but it also 
implemented the transition of  joint-stock companies in German Law from private partnerships to 
corporations with respect to both their internals as well as external relations (Kießling, 2007a, p. 
219). Moreover, the Stock Corporation Act did also unify the Prussian legal system in an ever-more 
important domain of economic activity. 
   17 
 
The debate on limited liability during the legislative process 
The legislative procedure 
The  proceedings  start  by  royal  order  on  the  13th  of  July  1837,  which  instructs  the  VIII. 
deputation on the revision of commercial law to consult external expert and draw up a draft law on 
joint stock companies (Kießling, 2007a, pp. 195-196). In fact the deputation had already been tasked 
in 1826 with the reform of joint stock company law in the wider context of general law revision. The 
motives of 31
st January 1840 state the rationale for the desired codification. In order to facilitate the 
business of joint-stock companies, the state previously could confer the status as legal person as well 
as the limited liability for shareholders and directors. In granting these privileges, the ministry of 
commerce was previously guided by public’s interest. Given the practical problems associated with 
the ALR for a large group of partners absent the status as a legal person, some solely profit seeking 
companies received the status as a legal person but without limited liability. The increasing demand 
for corporate status and limited liability finally makes the King order a general codification (Motives, 
in Baums, 1981, pp. 54-56). 
 A  first  draft  including  extensive  motives  is  submitted  by  a  commission,  which  included 
members from the deputation, representatives from the Berlin merchants as well as delegates from 
the ministry of the Interior, Finance, and Justice, on 31 January 1840. The draft is revised by the 
ministers of state Kamptz, Mühler, Rochow and Count von Alvensleben, and by the Ministry of State. 
The draft of the Ministry, together with a dissenting draft by Mühler and Count von Alvensleben, and 
the reports of Schön, Bülow and Hoffmann is then transferred by Cabinet Order of 31st January 1842 
to the State Council
19 for revision. In addition, the King, who is known as being an advocate of joint-
stock companies (Kießling, 2007a), hands over Pöhls’ (1842) work on the law of joint stock companies 
as well as the Dutch commercial code of 1838 to the State council.
20  
The State Council’s combined departments for finance and the judiciary create a report and a 
further draft law, which is then handed over to the State Council. The council then deliberates on the 
issue in four sessions, which are documented in four protocols. In doing so, it refers to the draft by 
                                                           
19 The Prussian State Council was a ‘consultative body’ which was founded in March 1817 and continued to 
exist formally until 1918. The chair was held by the king or an appointed president.  In the pre-constitutional 
period to 1848, the State Council was an ‘effective advisory body’ (Lilla, 2005, p. 9 *my translation+). "His field 
of  activity  included  all  legislative  and  administrative  norms,  other  administrative  measures,  jurisdictional 
conflicts between ministries, as well as advice on all issues brought before it by either law or by request of the 
King. Members of the State Council were: all adult royal princes, the Prime minister, the field marshals, the 
acting Minister of State, the state secretary of Ministry of State, the Postmaster General, Chief President of the 
‘Oberrechnungskammer’,  the  leaders  of  the  civil  and  military  cabinet,  commanding  generals  and 
‘Oberpräsidenten’ present in Berlin, and other persons appointed because of special royal confidence "(Ibid, p. 
9 [my translation]). See for the history of the State Council Schneider (1952). 
20 A contemporary translation is available at Schumacher (1840). 18 
 
the Ministry of State. The law is finally enacted by royal decree on the 9
th November 1843 (Baums, 
1981, pp. 30-31). 
As I hope to demonstrate in the following, the motives and protocols are vivid testimony of a 
controversial  debate  with  surprisingly  level  of  inquiry,  awareness  of  foreign  developments,  and 
understanding of incentive structure of directors, investors, and creditor. They provide evidence that 
parts of the Prussian administration did not perceive limited liability as the condition sine qua non of 
the joint-stock company, but rather as a special privilege that should only be granted by the state 
where  there  would  be  a  considerable  public  benefits  that  would  outweigh  the  negative 
consequences.  Nevertheless,  the  perception  that  limited  liability  was  necessary  feature  of 
shareholders with little equity each prevailed, although because the Prussian law makers failed to 
see the different implication of limited liability for  ‘sleeping’ partners and active investors.  
Besides the  printed  material  that  is  available  in  Baums  (1981),  there  is  a  wide  range of 
further potential material, e. g. personal correspondence between the ministers before and during 
the  official  legislative  process.  A  thorough  analysis  of  these  handwritten  documents,  which  are 
available at the Prussian State archives, is still missing. Also not considered in the analysis are those 
sources which are not directly related to the official legislative process. These are among other a 
report  by  the  Berlin  guild  of  merchants  of  1829,  various  reports  by  the  Minister  Count  von 
Alvensleben,
 the proceedings in Saxony in 1836/37
21 as well the French literature on the subject 
(Schumacher, 1937, p. 47). Also left out are the experience made with the railway legislation (see 
Kießling, 2007a, pp. 197-202, for details), the British and Dutch legislation, and the legal situation and 
reform proposals in the other German states (see Bergfeld, 2007).  A thorough analysis of these 
documents must be left to further research. 
The argument against the free availability of limited liability 
In §. 1. the first draft of the commission asserted that joint-stock companies needed a state 
concession in order to become legally valid (1
st draft of the commission, in Baums, 1981, p. 50) 
Indeed  state  concession  as  a  prerequisite  for  incorporation  is  undisputed  during  the  legal 
proceedings.
22 This is due to the concern that the unchecked creation of joint-stock companies might 
endanger fair competition by creating monopolies due to the large amount of capital involved.
23Also 
the fear that joint -stock companies might stamp out competition is  put in perspective  by the 
Smithian argument, according to which private entrepreneurs are favoured with respect to joint -
                                                           
21 See Bergfeld (2007, pp. 170-178) 
22See for example the statement of the State Council report (in Baums, 1981, p. 139) regarding incorporation.  
23 ‚Aktiengesellschaft vermöge ihres Uebergewichts an Kapital die einzelnen Gewerb- und Handeltreibenden, 
*…+, ganz zu erdrücken, jede Konkurrenz zu beseitigen, und so zum Nachtheil des Gewerbe- und Handelstandes 
wie des gesamten Publikums ein Monopol zu erlangen wissen möchten, *…+‘ (Motives, in Baums, 198, p. 57). 19 
 
stock companies because they do not have to bear administrative costs and are more free and 
flexible in their business decisions (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 66; see also State Council report, in 
Baums,  1981,  p.  143).  Nevertheless,  incorporation  of  joint-stock  corporations,  regardless  of  the 
liability regime, was to be checked by state confession. Thus, while bestowing licenced joint-stock 
companies  with  the  qualities  of  a  legal  person  was  not  very  controversial,  limited  liability  was 
vehemently opposed by high-ranking officials in the Prussian administration, the Minister of Justice 
von Mühler und Minister of Finance Count von Alvensleben   
 First, they believe that liability is meant to protect debtors from incurring large losses in case 
of bankruptcy. Second, they argue against limited liability because it encourages the speculation in 
stocks.
24 Third, according to Mühler und v. Alvensleben, under ALR shareholders of exis ting joint-
stock can in certain instances still be personally liable, thus existing   German law does not offer 
limited liability for corporations (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 67). Finally, the two ministers point out 
that limited liability would alter the existing incentive structures, not only for shareholders but also 
for managers, who would become more risk prone and negligent in their conduct of business.
25  
Nevertheless, the two Ministers acknowledge that the current legislation is rather restrictive 
to non-licenced joint-stock companies that are treated like partnerships before the law. Although not 
all joint-stock companies do not further the public good in the narrower sense, their creation is still 
economically desirable. For these firms, the pro visions of the ALR, which do not  provide for the 
existence of managers and passive shareholders , are a considerable burden (Motives, in Baums, 
1981, pp. 57-58). Thus, Mühler and von Alvensleben propose to allow for incorporation – given state 
concession – but to grant limited liability of only to those companies which are in the country’s 
interest and beneficial to the public (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 57). These privileges include: (1) the 
right to purchase and to own property in the company’s name, (2) the executions into the personal 
assets  of  the  shareholders  only  in  those  case  where  the  company  assets  are  insufficient,  (3)  a 
mandate for directors to conduct business with third parties, (4) representation in courts by the 
directors, (5) a provision that would allow for the exit of shareholders from the company (Motives, in 
Baums, 1981, pp. 58-62). Hence, for private profit seeking economic activities  the two ministers 
propose  a  de  facto  corporation  without  limited  liability,  which  they  call  privileged  partnership 
(‘priviliegierte  Societäten’).  However,  given  that  these  privileged  partnerships  would  still  involve 
                                                           
24 ‘Zu einer Zeit, wo das Spekulieren auf Aktien ohne wirkliches Interesse für das Unternehmen selbst an der 
Tagesordnung  sey,  mache  sich  ein  große  Vorsicht  nötig,  bevor  ein  Privilegium  für  eine  Aktiengesellschaft 
ertheilt werde‘ (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 67). 
25  ‘Gerade  in  der  persönlichen  Verhaftung  der  Theilnehmer  liege  ein  wirksames  Mittel,  dem  Hange  zum 
Aktienspiele entgegen zu wirken und die Interessenten zu veranlassen, daß Unternehmen im Voraus gehörig zu 
überlegen. *….+ Die Theilnehmer möchten ihrerseits durch entsprechende Anweisung und Kontrollierung ihrer 
Vertreter  dafür  sorgen,  daß  letztere  nur  innerhalb  des  gemeinschaftlichen  Vermögens  Verpflichtungen 
eingingen.  Würden  diese  Grenzen  überschritten,  so  möchten  die  Theilnehmer  die  Folgen  des  mangelhaft 
verwalteten Unternehmens tragen, nicht aber das Publikum büßen lassen‘ (Motives, in Baums, 1980, p. 67). 20 
 
large amounts of capital and thus bear the danger of monopolies, their formation would have to 
control by state in order to avoid the formation of monopolies (Dissenting draft, in Baums, 1981, p. 
106). 
Mühler  and  v.  Alvensleben  acknowledge  that  limited  liability  would  be  the  decisive 
distinction between the two types of corporation (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 63): a corporation 
without limited liability would no longer qualify as joint-stock company, but would be a new form of 
business organisation. Hence, even the opponents of a widespread introduction of limited liability 
assume that limited liability is somewhat the key feature of joint-stock corporations. However, these 
forms of businesses are privileged against other firms and thus require not only state concession, but 
must also be in the public interest in order justify their status. They underline their position by 
referring to the example of England, where shareholders are fully liable, if limited liability is not 
granted by special charter (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 66). 
Another argument for restricting limited liability to those companies which are beneficial to 
the public is made by delegate from the Ministry of Commerce. By referring to the English case, he 
argues that joint-stock companies can exist without limited liability. On the contrary, he insists that 
the full shareholder liability is responsible for the credibility of Scottish banks. Although he admits 
that limited liability will facilitate vis-a-vis the founding of joint-stock companies, this would lead to a 
considerable transfer of risk to the public. Given that shareholders participate in the profits, it seems 
reasonable to him that they should also bear the risk. Concerning the uneven distribution of profit 
and risk under a full liability regime, he argues that this would lead shareholders to transfer shares 
only  to  solvent  persons,  which  would  reduce  the  overall  number  of  joint-stock  companies  but 
increase their soundness (Motives, in Baums, 1981, pp. 70-71).  
Moreover, because under a limited liability regime, the public shares a part of the losses, 
such a regime can only be justified by previous public benefits, although it might be difficult to 
generally define when a company serves the public interest and thus it being granted will depend on 
administrative discretion. This explicitly involves the support of infant industries by granting limited 
liability. The argument that any company is in the public interest cannot be generally accepted. In 
particular it does not follow from it that joint-stock companies will be privileged in their contractual 
relations with third parties vis-à-vis private entrepreneurs. Such a widespread adoption of limited 
liability for joint-stock companies would favour them over other business entities. Therefore joint-
stock companies should be granted corporate status in order to facilitate business operations but 
without limited liability (Motives, in Baums, 1981, pp. 71-72). 
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The argument for limited liability: Shareholders as passive investors  
In the following I will demonstrate that it is the idea of many shareholders with little equity 
each that is the key argument in granting limited liability to all licenced joint-stock companies. While 
there are other arguments for limited liability, especially the uneven share of risk and profits under a 
full  liability  regime,  which  are  used  especially  in  the  beginning  of  the  legislative  procedure  for 
justifying the privilege, later in the proceedings it is the idea of shareholders being similar to a 
‘sleeping’ partner – or passive investors – that carries the day. This is due to the fact that the ALR 
already knows the concept of a sleeping partner, which effectively grants limited liability to passive 
investors.     
Even before the proceedings, the Ministers Mühler und v. Alvensleben in a series of letters 
agreed on the constitutive fundamentals of joint-stock companies. These include (1) widespread 
shareholding where each shareholder pays in just a small stake and does not participate in the daily 
business of running the company, which is done by appointed representatives, (2) the status of a 
legal person and limited liability for shareholders and directors alike, and (3) that shareholders may 
enter and exits the company without recuperating their paid in capital (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 
56).  This  definition  of  joint-stock  companies  where  investors  have  very  little  influences  on  the 
conduct of business remains unopposed in the course of the proceedings and reiterated many times 
over in the proceedings (see for example United State Council report, in Baums, 1981, p. 137).  
The majority is in favour of granting limited liability to all incorporated joint-stock companies, 
not only to those that of public interest. Consequently, the first draft Act included limited liability for 
all joint-stock companies and consequently no shareholder was liable for the companies beyond the 
nominal value of his shares (§. 11). In addition, the executive directors are not liable to a third party 
for the company’s deeds as long as their acts do not violate the provisions given by the act (§.16).  
Their key argument is  that in reality it would be quiet difficult to determine whether a particular firm 
is in the public interest because the majority supports the classical notions according to which all 
private firms also serve the general interest (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 65). Indeed, they assume 
that a restrictive legislation would only lead to a flight of capital and to an increase in imports, as 
joint-stock companies will be founded abroad (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 65).  
For  the  proponents  of  limited  liability,  the  key  argument  in  favour  is  one  of  internal 
governance and risk and profit sharing. Without limited liability, the risk associated with being a 
shareholder  ultimately  depends  on the  respective personal wealth.  However,  the  distribution  of 
profits as well as property rights depends on the amount of shares held and thus do not reflect the 
economic  risk  taken.  Under  these  conditions,  joint-stock  companies  with  a  large  group  of 22 
 
shareholders would not be able to exist.
26 Indeed, the argument that  investors have a marginal 
influence on the decision of a joint-stock company is not raised by the proponent of limited liability, 
but  by Mühler and v. Alvensleben who see  it as the most  visible  ch aracteristic of joint-stock 
corporation, although it is not a constitutive property on its own (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 63). .   
Still,  the  majority  argues  that  to  dispose  of  full  liability  would  not  have  the  negative 
consequences feared by Mühler and Alvensleben, especially with respect to the incentive structure 
for managers and shareholders. It is argued that the success of firms is often determined by external 
factors outside  the  directors’  control  and  hence managerial  liability  would  not  improve  a  firm’s 
performance and any deeds by the management which are ultra vires or a violation of the law render 
the directors fully liable (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 68). Finally the majority argues that Mühler and 
von Alvensleben’s key argument against limited liability – the speculation in shares – is best impeded 
by requiring shareholders to pay in the full capital of tradable shares (Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 
68).  
Consequently,  the  revised  draft  by  von  Kamptz  Mühler,  von  Rochow  und  Graf  von 
Alvensleben states in §. 12. that shareholders are only liable up to the nominal value of their share. 
Moreover, §. 13.  explicitly states that shareholders do not become debtors to the creditors of the 
company, but is only a debtor to the firm in case he has not paid in the full amount of capital. The 
draft is then discussed on two meetings of the Royal Ministry of State on the 29
th of June and 10
th of 
July 1841, in which the main arguments, as spelled out above, are repeated (Protocol 29
th of June 
1841,  Baums  (1980),  pp.  87-89).
27  In  the  concluding  vote   vote  it  is  decided  to  include  the  
requirement of a company being of public interest as a prerequisite for a concession in §. 1., while 
the proposal of a privileged partnership made by Mühler and Alvensleben is rejected. However, the 
council tasks the two ministers with drafting a dissenting draft  that would include incorporation 
without limited liability
28  (Protocol 29
th  of  June  1841,  Baums  (1980),  pp.  87-89).  The  following 
                                                           
26 ‚Das Wesen der Aktiengesellschaften besteht darin, daß Viele zusammentreten, um ein bestimmtes, mit den 
Kosten und der Gefahr des Unternehmens im Verhältnis stehendes Kapital zusammenzubringen, dessen Ertrag 
nach dem Verhältnis der Antheilnahme getheilt werden soll. Hierdurch soll zweierlei erreicht werden;  
1. daß ein Jeder weiß, welchen bestimmten Theil seines Vermögens er der Gefahr des Unternehmens hingiebt, 
und 2. daß ein bestimmter Maaßstab für die Theilung des Gewinns vorhanden ist. 
Dies eigentliche Karakteristische der Aktienvereine wird unmöglich gemacht oder gänzlich vernichtet, sobald 
man dieselben durch die Bestimmung, daß jeder Theilnehmer auch über den Betrag seines Einschusses hinaus 
haften solle, den gewöhnlichen Handelsgesellschaften gleichstellt. Der ganze Zweck der Aktienvereine wird 
damit vereitelt. Haftet der einzelne Aktionair auch über den Betrag der Aktie mit seinem ganzen Vermögen; so 
hört das Verhältnis der Aktionaire auf, ein gleichmäßiges zu seyn. Die Gefahr ist dann für die Begüterten groß, 
für die Unvermögenden gering. Auf solche Bedingung hin kann aber nicht eine große Anzahl von Mitgliedern 
zusammentreten‘(Motives, in Baums, 1981, p. 68). 
27  For  example,  v.  Alvensleben  argues  that  granting  large  corporations  limited  liability  will  endanger 
competition as these will have an advantage of smaller enterprises. Kamptz by referring to the necessary state 
concession responds that it is not in the state’s intention to grant corporate status to all joint-stock comapnies. 
The decision whether to licence a firm should thereby not be based on rules, but on discretion, a proposal v. 
Alvensleben refutes because it would lead to the state being accused of arbitrary decision making  
28 See the draft prepared by Mühler and v. Alvensleben, in Baums (1980, pp. 101-108). 23 
 
meeting in July is then dedicated to technical matters (Protocol 10
th of July 1841, Baums (1980), pp. 
91-94). Consequently, the draft by the Royal Ministry of State follows the revised draft by v. Kamptz 
Mühler, v. Rochow und v. Alvensleben in granting limited liability to shareholders in §§. 13.-14 (draft 
by the Royal Ministry of State, in Baums, 1981, p. 98). 
The  justification  for  limited  liability  slightly  changes  in  the  report  drafted  by  the  State 
Council’s combined departments for finance and the judiciary, which is presented at the 16
th of 
March 1843. For the first time it defines shareholders as sleeping partners in line with ALR §§. 651.-
651. Th. II. Lit. 8
29 who are not involved in the daily business of running the company ( United State 
Council report, in Baums, 1981, p. 13 7). Indeed, it raises the question whether investors are nor 
already capable of achieving limited liability via sleeping partnerships, in which only one destitute 
person becomes an official partner ( United State Council report, in Baums, 1981, p. 140).  Given 
shareholders’ voice in determining business policy, such a judgement seems rather odd, especially 
because Oberregierungsrat Hoffmann, the only ‘trained’ economists involved in the proceedings, 
highlighted the shareholders involvement in business decision in his report. In fact, he argued for 
limited  liability  as  means  for  facilitation  incorporated  joint-stock  companies  because  the 
shareholders were actively involved in the administration of the company as opposed to passive 
bond holders (Report by Hoffmann, in Baums, 1981, pp. 119-130). For Hoffmann, shareholders are a 
middle way between the ‘active’ business owner and the ‘passive’ creditor, a view that is endorsed 
by the State Council’s combined departments for finance and the judiciary (United State Council 
report, in Baums, 1981, p. 143).    
 The  State  Council  report  then  sums  the  previous  discussion  up  and  identifies  two  key 
question: (1) whether corporate limited liability is to be restricted to enterprises that are in the 
public interest, and (2) whether there is the need for a further type of organization which allows for 
incorporation  without  limited  liability  (privileged  partnerships)  (United  State  Council  report,  in 
Baums, 1981, p. 139).  Concerning the first question, the report states that corporate limit liability 
should be not be restricted to joint-stocks companies that are in the public interest as longs as these 
have registered share. Only for companies with bearer share, where the speculation in share is more 
frequent and hazardous, should the privilege of corporate limit liability restrict to firms serving the 
common good (United State Council report, in Baums, 1981, pp. 139-144; see also the draft by the 
United State Council, in Baums, 1981, p. 160). Limited liability on the other hand is then justified 
once again with the asymmetrical risk and profit sharing already mentioned in the motives (United 
State Council report, in Baums, 1981, p. 145).  
                                                           
29 ‚§. 651. Derjenige, welcher der Societät ein bestimmtes Capital mit der Bedingung anvertrauet hat, daß er, 
statt der Zinsen, am Gewinne oder Verluste nach Verhältniß dieses Capitals Theil nehmen wolle, wird ein stiller 
Gesellschafter (Associé en commendite) genannt. §. 652. Ist sein Name in der Firma nicht mit enthalten, noch 
er sonst als ein Gesellschafter ausdrücklich bekannt gemacht: so haftet er den Societätsgläubigern nur mit 
seinem in der Handlung stehenden Capitale; und kann ein Mehreres zu den Societätsschulden beyzutragen, 
nicht angehalten werden.‘ 24 
 
Finally, all previous documents are handed over to the Royal State Council, which meets on 
the 14
th of June 1843 for the first of four consecutive meetings. In the first meeting, the Minister of 
Law Revision, v. Savigny, argues in line with the combined departments that limited liability can be 
achieved via the ALR by posing as sleeping partners or by endowing a manager only with limited 
authority, which restricts his freedom of contracts to predetermined amount. Consequently, argues 
that  it  is  incorporation  and  not  limited  liability,  which  is  the  distinctive  feature  of  joint-stock 
corporations. Therefore the plan of Mühler and Alvensleben of  privileged partnerships does not 
address the real problem (1
st Protocol State Council, in Baums, 1981, pp. 170-172). Consequently, the 
idea of incorporation with unlimited liability is finally dropped (3
rd Protocol State Council, in Baums, 
1981, p. 185).   
Apparently, Savigny and others fails to see the difference in influence on business policy 
between shareholders and ‘sleeping’ partners. While sleeping partners have no say in the running of 
the company, shareholders do determine a joint-stock corporations business conduct quiet strongly, 
albeit  indirectly.  Moreover,  the  extent  of  their  influence  depends  on  their  share  of  stock  they 
possess. Indeed, in realty there are many cases where the dominating shareholder of a company is 
also the managing director. Thus, Savigny’s argument that limited liability was available in Prussia 
even before 1843 is only half true. If you were a passive ‘sleeping’ investors in a partnership, liability 
was indeed limited to the investment, albeit without any control over the firm. The new quality of 
corporate liability that Savigny and his colleagues failed to see was that investors who were actively 
involved  in  determining  business  policy  were  now  protected  from  the  negative  results  of  their 
decisions.  
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Conclusion 
While many people believe that limited liability is the condition sine qua non of the modern 
corporation, previous research has impressively demonstrated that such an impression does not 
match reality. In fact, there are many cases where large corporation with unlimited shareholder 
liability have operated quiet successfully for many year and their shares were tradable on liquid 
markets. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, there is a tendency of scholars to highlight only 
the positive effects of limited liability without naming the negative side-effects. The past financial 
crisis has however highlighted the need to think about the negative consequences of an institutional 
design, where the costs of private action are no longer internalized. Thus many of the commonly held 
believes concerning the necessity of limited liability fall short of reality. 
The foregone discussion about the advent of limited liability in 19
th century Prussia indicates 
that at least parts of the Prussian administration considered limited liability not as a prerequisite for 
incorporation, but rather as special privilege to be granted in order to subsidies enterprises that were 
perceived to be in the public good. Limited liability was seen as a distinctive feature of joint-stock 
companies, but not of incorporation or partnerships with many investors as such. Consequently the 
joint-stock corporation was to be reserved for firms that served the common good beyond the usual 
economic benefits of economic activity. The majority of the administration did not follow this line of 
argument. It rather saw limited liability rather as a distinct feature of joint-stock corporation that is 
indeed a necessary condition for its existence. This is due to the misconception of a joint-stock 
company consisting of many investors with little equity each. In addition, without limited liability, 
there would be an uneven distribution of risk and profit. This argument is refuted by the opponents 
of limited liability by stating that such incorporations would have to allow only wealthy persons to 
become their shareholder and by referring to the case of England. 
In to counter this argument, its proponents argue that shareholders may gain limited liability 
by becoming a sleeping partner in existing partnerships. Thus, limited liability is already a feature of 
existing forms of business organisation and not the decisive novelty. Hence, the idea of allowing 
incorporation without limited liability is finally dropped from the agenda.  They key problem with 
that  line  of  thought  is  that  shareholder,  even  with  free-floating  shares,  have  influence  on  the 
company’s conduct as opposed to sleeping partners. Worse, given that today shareholders consist 
mainly of institutional investors (El-Shagi and Ilgmann, 2010) and that these shareholders have a 
large influence over the business strategy (Ireland, 2010, p. 848), it might worthwhile to reconsider 
the role of limited liability in the economy. 
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